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INTRODUCTION

Chase's Respondent's Brief attempts to make this appeal more complicated than it is. This
appeal is about just two things: whether Trusty v. Ray is still good law, and whether the terms
"acceleration" and "maturity date" can be meaningfully decoupled from each other. Notably,
Chase's brief avoids addressing the first of these issues - it fails to cite Trusty v. Ray at all and
relies heavily on non-authoritative cases from outside the state ofldaho.
This case is not about whether the entry of default was proper, or whether Chase was
properly served, or whether on remand the district court should hold an evidentiary hearing. The
only critical fact under the relevant statutes is that the debt secured by the deed of trust in this case
was accelerated more than five years before CMJ filed to quiet title. Due to Chase's default at the
district court, that fact cannot be disputed. This case calls for a straightforward application of the
Idaho Code and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court should reverse the district court's
order dismissing the case, remand with instructions to enter judgment or default judgment in
CMJ's favor, and award CMJ costs and fees on appeal.
ARGUMENT
1. Chase's argument that the stated maturity date persisted despite acceleration ignores
accepted definitions of key legal terms.

Chase suggests that CMJ's proposed statutory construction is incorrect because it violates
the "cardinal rule of statutory construction that all parts of a statute should be given meaning."
Resp't's Br. 7 (quoting Robbins v. Cnty. ofBlaine, 134 Idaho 113, 120 (2000)). Chase then recites
related rules of statutory construction that "a statute must be 'construed so that effect is given to
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its provisions, and no part is rendered superfluous or insignificant" and "the statute must be
construed as a whole." Id. at 7-8 (quoting Hoskins v. Howard, 132 Idaho 311,315 (1998)). Chase
appears to take issue with CMJ' s intentional decision not to offer argument related to the last
sentence of Idaho Code section 5-214A. That sentence provides that "[i]f the obligation or
indebtedness secured by such mortgage does not state a maturity date, then the date of the accrual
of the cause of action giving rise to the right to foreclose shall be deemed the date of maturity of
such obligation or indebtedness." See IC.§ 5-214A.
Here, the first page of the Credit Line clearly provides "Maturity Date: 08/09/2037." R.
20, Comp!. Ex. B p. 1. The second page of the Deed of Trust clearly provides "the Debt is due and
payable in full thirty (30) years from the date of this Deed of Trust which is 08/09/2037 (the
"Maturity Date")." Therefore, the last sentence of section 5-214A is inapplicable in the present
case because the condition it states ("[i]fthe obligation or indebtedness secured by such mortgage
does not state a maturity date ... ") is not satisfied on these facts. That statutory sentence presumably
exists to ensure that a lender cannot avoid the application of section 5-214A by failing to provide
a maturity date as of a date certain. The sentence operates as a gap-filler to ensure that the section
encompasses all mortgages. CMJ' s choice not to reference that sentence was not an oversight; the
sentence simply has no application in this case. Because its condition is not met, omitting the
sentence does not render it superfluous or insignificant. The statute is still construed as a whole
and all of its parts are given meaning - some of the parts simply do not apply in this case.
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2. CMJ is entitled to the relief sought in spite of Chase's arguments regarding the
contractual language.
a. Although the contract sets the initial maturity date, acceleration by definition
changes the maturity date.
Chase argues that "the actions of the parties cannot modify defined contractual terms."
Resp't's Br. 9. This argument misunderstands the nature of the issues before the Court. It is true

here that "maturity date" is a contractually-defined term. But that term is defined in part as the
date "the Debt is due and payable in full." R. JO, Comp!. Ex. A p. 2. CMJ does not dispute that
contracting parties can redefine commonly-used words as they see fit. But if a party truly intends
to abrogate a well-understood definition, the common-use definition should be clearly disclaimed.
In the documents at issue here, it is not at all clear that there was any meeting of the minds
regarding redefining the col?monly-used term "maturity date." At best the definition of"maturity
date" in the contract is ambiguous. "Ambiguities in a contract of adhesion should be construed
against the drafter." Fannie Mae v. Hafer, 158 Idaho 694, 702 (2015). "A contract of adhesion is
an agreement between two parties of unequal bargaining strength, expressed in the language of a
standardized contract, writt~n by the more powerful bargainer to meet its own needs, and offered
to the weaker party on a 'take-it-or-leave-it basis."' Id Because Chase's predecessor-in-interest
Washington Mutual drafted the adhesion contract here, any ambiguity should be resolved in CMJ's
favor. More to the point, Chase's argument is merely a post-hoc attempt to avoid the natural
consequence of the fact that "accelerate" and "maturity date" are tightly coupled terms that cannot
meaningfully be separated. See Appellant's Br. 10-12.
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Moreover, "maturity date" is a term used in the applicable statute. Regardless of how the
contract defined or used the term, for purposes of applying section 5-214A the term must be given
its "plain, obvious, and rational meaning." Hammer v. City of Sun Valley, 2016 Ida. LEXIS 418
(Dec. 21, 2016) at *13 (c;iting Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 478 (2002)).
Unambiguous statutes are applied as written. Id "A statute is ambiguous where the language is
capable of more than one reasonable construction .... If the statute is ambiguous, then it must be
construed to mean what the legislature intended for it to mean .... To determine that intent, [courts]
examine not only the literal words of the statute, but also the reasonableness of proposed
constructions, the public policy behind the statute, and its legislative history." Id at 13-15
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Notably absent from the list of how courts
construe statutes is an evaluation of what the parties or their contract suggest a statutory term
means. In any case, section.5-214A is not ambiguous. As detailed at length in CMJ's Appellant's
Brief, "maturity date" is well-defined and well-understood to mean the actual date payment of a
debt is due in full. The fact that the present maturity date differs from the original maturity date
is a function of the acceleration clause - not the maturity date definition. As detailed in CMJ's
Appellant's Brief, the acc~leration clause is meant to specifically change the maturity date otherwise what is it that is being accelerated? Here, the maturity date was accelerated to a point
more than five (5) years prior to the filing of CMJ's quiet title claim.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - PAGE 7
A+J; Matter: 6652-008

b. Contract terms addressing waiver do not change the result.
Chase insists that under the contract documents, CMJ waived the statute of limitations and
Chase's decision to delay foreclosing does not result in a waiver of its right to do so. Resp't's Br.
10-11. Neither of these arguments are applicable here.

CMJ does not dispute that the Credit Line includes language purporting to waive the statute
of limitations. However, that language is inapplicable to the matter at issue for several reasons.
Statutes oflimitations procedurally operate as affirmative defenses, but CMJ is not a defendant in
this action and therefore any purported waiver of a statute of limitations defense is not relevant.
Moreover, the purported waiver of statute of limitations appears in the Credit Line but does not
appear in the Deed of Trust. 1 To the extent any statute of limitations is relevant at all, it is only
relevant with respect to the Deed of Trust and only for the purpose of evaluating whether the statute
oflimitations for Chase to foreclose the Deed of Trust has lapsed, per Idaho Code section 45-1515
and 5-214A. Any waiver of a statute oflimitations on the Credit Line has no impact on the statute
of limitations to foreclose the Deed of Trust. Further, CMJ is not a party to the Credit Line and
did not itself make any such waiver. The purported waiver was made by Cory Jakobson, not CMJ .2
Finally, it is not clear under Idaho law that a statute of limitations may be waived prospectively.

The language in the Credit Line provides: "You waive any statutes of limitations ... of this Agreement"; elsewhere
the Credit Line defines "Agreement" as "This WaMu Mortgage Plus(TM) Agreement and Disclosure" without
referencing the Deed of Trust. R. 20, Comp!. Ex. B p. 1.
1

Of course, any statute of limitation issues became inapplicable after Cory Jakobson was granted a discharge in his
bankruptcy case.

2
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Although Idaho appellate courts have apparently not addressed this issue, it has been considered
by other states and by legal scholars:
According to Williston on Contracts, most jurisdictions that have ruled on this issue
hold that such waivers are void:
Although in certain states it has been held that a contract not to plead the
statute oflimitations whenever made may be binding indefinitely, the great
and substantial majority of jurisdictions hold that such a promise is
definitely in contravention of the public policy of the statute and will not,
in consequence, be enforced.
When thus interpreted, that is, as a promise never to plead the statute it is
immaterial when the promise is made, because, by the general rule, such a
promise is illegal whether made before or after maturity of the debt.
31 Williston on Contracts § 79: 110 (4th ed. 2004) (footnotes omitted); accord 3
Corbin on Contracts § 9.9 (rev. ed. 1996) ("A promise not to plead the statute of
limitations as a defense, or a promise to waive completely the benefit of it, are
generally contrary to public policy particularly if made by contract in advance.");
Haggerty v. Williams, 84 Conn. App. 675, 855 A.2d 264, 268 (Conn. App. Ct.
2004) ("'[A] stipulation contained in a written instrument, waiving the defense of
the statute oflimitations permanently, as to any breach of contract that might occur
in the future, is void and unenforceable as contrary to public policy."' (Quoting
Hirt/er v. Hirt/er, 566 P.2d 1231, 1231 (Utah 1977)).
As the Connecticut Court of Appeals noted, recognizing permanent waivers would
lead to their routine insertion and ultimately eviscerate the statute of limitations.
Haggerty, 855 A.2d at 269. This concern was expressed by the trial judge in his
oral opinion:
I think that [a perpetual waiver of limitations] would be [] against public
policy. And I think there's a good reason for that. If you could perpetually
waive the statute of limitations then every note would automatically have a
clause in it with a perpetual waiver of the statute oflimitations and we'd be
back where we started from. And I think that that is just simply not the law.
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Ahmad v. Eastpines Terrace Apts., Inc., 200 Md. App. 362, 374-376 (2011). Thus, to the extent

the purported waiver appears to operate prospectively, it should be deemed void and unenforceable
as against public policy.
Chase also quotes a section of the Credit Line providing that "[t]o the extent pennitted by
law, we may delay or waive the enforcement of any of our rights under this Agreement without
losing that right or any other right.. .. " R. 25, Comp!. Ex. B p. 6. The key part of this paragraph is
the initial clause, "[t]o the extent permitted by law." The law, namely Idaho Code sections 451515 and 5-214A, only permitted Chase to delay enforcing its right to foreclose for up to five years
from the maturity date. An attempt to contractually agree that such a statute does not apply has no
effect. Further, and once again, the reservation ofrights here applies to the Credit Line but not the
Deed of Trust. It is the Deed of Trust that is more properly the subject of the instant action, and
that document includes no such reservation of rights. Nor may the reservation in the Credit Line
reasonably be read to apply to the Deed of Trust in light of the Credit Line's definition of
"Agreement."
c. Chase's public policy arguments fail and do not change the required result.

Chase argues that CMJ's interpretation "underestimates [the] importance of the public
notice requirements created by the maturity date contained in the loan documents." Resp't's Br.
12-13. First, Idaho Code section 5-214A is not concerned with providing notice to unrelated third

parties. Second, even ifthe·notice of the maturity date is important, the public also has notice that
the maturity date may be accelerated upon certain events. Lastly, for loans such as this where no

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - PAGE 10
A+J; Matter: 6652-008

payments have been made for a number of years, a maturity date of record does not provide a good
indicator of quality of risk. Chase's purported public policy arguments are not availing.
Chase next suggests that CMJ' s interpretation "seeks to undermine the statute by
introducing a floating statute of limitations that is based entirely upon the actions of the parties,
which will only serve to create confusion (and litigation) for courts, lenders, borrowers, and third
parties." Resp 't 's Br. 13. This is a very broad statement. The proposition that acceleration
changes the date on which the statute of limitations begins to run is a simple proposition that is
consistent with the most natural reading of the statute. By contrast, Chase's suggestion to sever
the enduring and well-understood relationship between acceleration and maturity is the
interpretation that would add confusion and remove clarity.

Further, "floating" statutes of

limitation are common in any contract scenario - a breach of a contract may be cured, or there may
be continuing breaches of a ·contract (thus constantly resetting a statute of limitations for breach of
the contract).

d. So long as the acceleration date occurred more than 5 years prior to CMJ's
quiet title action, the specific acceleration date does not matter.
Chase points out, correctly, that there are multiple events of default that CMJ could have
argued accelerated the maturity date. Respt's Br. 13-14. Chase seems to take issue with the fact
that CMJ did not argue that Jakobson's violation of the "Due on Sale" provision in the Deed of
Trust accelerated the maturity date in 2007. Id. at 14. But this intentionally ignores that CMJ's
allegations in its Complaint and its arguments on appeal clearly claim that acceleration occurred

"no later than April 6, 2011." R. 7, Comp!. ,i 21; Appellant's Br. 7 (emphasis added). CMJ's
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Complaint was filed on June 17, 2016. R. 4, Comp!. p. 1. Because Idaho Code section 5-214A
requires foreclosure within five years, CMJ's burden was merely to prove that the statute began to
run at any time prior to June 17, 2011. CMJ adequately alleged that the maturity date was changed
no later than April 6, 2011, and Chase's failure to timely appear and answer requires this allegation
to be admitted. Further, Chase's argument appears to further admit that acceleration occurred prior
to required date - June 17, 2011. CMJ therefore met its burden. Nonetheless, CMJ agrees that it
could have argued that acceleration occurred as early as 2007 when Jakobson transferred the
property to CMJ.
More importantly, Chase misconstrues CMJ's argument by suggesting that CMJ is
representing that "any event of default serves to reset the maturity date for statute of limitation
purposes." Resp 't 's Br. 14. This is not CMJ's argument. CMJ's argument is that any acceleration
resets the maturity date, as it must based on both the common sense and legal definitions of those
terms. Some loan documents provide for automatic acceleration on certain events of default by
using mandatory language· such as "shall" rather than permissive language such as "at the
Beneficiary's option." If lenders are concerned that automatic acceleration of a maturity date
might limit their period to foreclose, then their loan documents should be written with permissive
rather than mandatory language. Here, the "Due on Sale" provision in the Deed of Trust provides
that " ... the entire Debt shall become immediately due and payable in full upon sale or other
transfer of the Property." R. 11, Comp/. Ex. A p. 3 (emphasis added). Further, the Credit Line
provides that, upon Chase's termination of the Credit Line (which actually occurred), "the entire
outstanding balance of the Credit Line ... will be immediately due and payable without prior notice
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.. and you agree to pay immediately such amount plus any other amounts due under this
Agreement." R. 25, Comp!. Ex. B, p. 6 (emphasis added). Thus, both events of default identified
by the parties (the Credit Line clause identified by CMJ, and the Due on Sale provision identified
by Chase) required immediate acceleration of the maturity date. .
3. The district court erred in failing to deem CMJ's factual allegations admitted in light
of Chase's default.
Chase makes several arguments regarding the district court's entry of default against
Chase. As an initial matter, Chase's brief includes a section heading stating that "The Lower Court
Properly Denied the Appellant's Application for Default." Resp 't 's Br. 15. Setting aside, for a
moment, the merits of that position - this heading is factually incorrect. The district court here
granted CMJ's motion for entry of default, but it denied CMJ's motion for entry of default
judgment. It may be that Chase merely omitted the word ''judgment" from the end of its section
heading.
a. Chase's alleged deficiencies in the Complaint are a red herring.
Chase argues that the district court correctly deemed the maturity date a question of law
rather than fact. Resp 't 's Br. 16. Ultimately Chase concludes that "CMJ' s Complaint failed to
state a legitimate cause of action because an acceleration is not a maturity date for statute of
limitations purposes." Id. at 17. For the reasons outlined in CMJ's Appellant's Brief and
elsewhere in this Reply Brief, while CMJ recognizes that maturity date and acceleration does not
mean the same thing- acceleration and maturity date are inextricably linked and Chase's argument
must fail.
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Next Chase argues that CMJ is not entitled to the reliefit seeks because its Complaint lacks
foundation. Id Chase points to the record's lack of a deed conveying the subject real property to
CMJ and lack of evidence that Jakobson stopped paying on the Credit Line. Id. at 17-18. This
argument misunderstands Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 8(b)(6) and the effect of failing to deny
'
an allegation. Idaho's pleading requirements mandate that "[a] pleading
that states a claim for

relief must contain ... a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief." JR.C.P. 8(a)(2). It is a long-standing principle that a claim for relief need not include
or attach all of the evidence necessary to prove the allegations made; the purpose of a complaint
is merely to "put[] the adverse party on notice of the claims brought against it." Taylor v.

McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 843-844 (2010). The purpose is not to require a complaining party to
disclose all evidence sufficient to prove its allegations; otherwise there would be no need for the
discovery process. More importantly, requiring a party to provide all proof of its allegations with
its initial pleadings would eviscerate our justice system by eliminating the concept of, or need for,
a civil trial. Very few cases could ever be brought and sustained if such were the standard.
In light of the applicable pleading standard, CMJ was under no duty to offer, in its
Complaint or other initial pleadings, the evidence that Chase suggests was required. The very
point of Rule 8(b)(6) is to· ensure that when a party fails to appear and properly deny factual
allegations that those allegations are then deemed admitted. This case presents an opportunity to
reaffirm and apply that rule in its straightforward and customary manner. Chase is attempting to
use these arguments as a red herring to divert attention from the fact that it failed to respond to
CMJ' s complaint.
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b. Setting aside the entry of default is not a proper subject of this appeal, and
should not be ordered.
Chase further argues that if the Court agrees with CMJ, "the proper remedy is to set aside
the entry of default and remand the case for further proceedings." Resp 't 's Br. 18. Chase suggests
that procedural deficiencies with service and with the entry of default require that the entry of
default be set aside. Id However, CMJ waived these issues by failing to cross-appeal.
In Idaho, a timely notice of appeal or cross-appeal is a jurisdictional prerequisite to
challenge a determination made by a lower court. Failure to timely file such a
notice shall cause automatic dismissal of the issue on appeal." Miller v. Bd of
Trustees, 132 Idaho 244,248, 970 P.2d 512, 516 (1998) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Though Hamilton's dependents seek to modify the decision below, they
failed to file a necessary cross-appeal.

Hamilton v. Alpha Servs., LLC, 158 Idaho 683, 693 (2015). Additionally, "a cross-appeal is
required only when the respondent seeks to change or add to the relief afforded below, but not
when it merely seeks to sustain a judgment for reasons presented at trial which were not relied
upon by the trial judge but should have been." Walker v. Shoshone County, 112 Idaho 991, 993
(1987). Here, Chase seeks to change the relief afforded below by setting aside the entry of default.
But Chase failed to cross-appeal and so cannot raise that issue. Nor is the issue of the entry of
default a "subsidiary issue fairly comprised" in the issues CMJ raised, so Chase cannot raise it via
CMJ's appeal under Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(4) or 35(b)(4). Accordingly, CMJ is entitled to
have the Court refuse to consider Chase's arguments that the entry of default was improper or that
Chase was improperly served.
Notwithstanding Chase's failure to preserve those issues for appeal, neither issue should
be granted by this Court. CMJ filed its Complaint and Summons on June 17, 2016, and an
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Affidavit of Service on June 24, 2016. R. 2. There was no other case activity before CMJ filed its
Motion for Entry of Default and Default Judgment against [Chase] on July 27, 2016, supported by
an affidavit of counsel filed the same day. R. 2. Chase filed its first appearance in the case, a
Notice of Appearance, and an Objection a week later, on August 3, 2016. R. 2. The district court
signed the order for entry of default that same day (August 3, 2016), but did not file it until August
16, 2016, the same day it entered its order and judgment dismissing CMJ's claims. R. 2-3, 42.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a)(l) provides that "[w]hen a party against whom a
judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is
shown by affidavit or otherwise, the court must order entry of the party's default. If a party has
appeared in the action, that party must be served with 3 days' written notice of the application for
entry of default before default may be entered." IR. C.P. 55(a)(l). CMJ properly moved for entry
of default after Chase failed to appear within its required time. CMJ was not obligated to provide
three days' written notice of its application for entry of default to Chase because Chase had not
appeared in the matter. In fact, CMJ was entitled to an entry of default the moment it filed its
application; the Rule provides that under the proper circumstances, "the court must order entry of
the party's default." (emphasis added). By coincidence, Chase happened to file its notice of
appearance before the district court actually entered its default. CMJ was entitled to an entry of
default even after Chase had appeared, because Chase's appearance occurred more than three days
after CMJ's motion. That is, even if CMJ had served a three-day written notice on Chase on July
27, 2016, the fact that Chase did not appear until a full seven days later means that CMJ still would
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have been able to move for entry of default before Chase first appeared. 3 Rule 55(a)(l) is a simple
and straightforward rule that would be made much more complex if Chase's late-filed notice of
appearance were allowed to reset the Rule's operation when default had already been requested.
Indeed, allowing Chase to derail the entry of default on these facts might encourage future parties
who have not timely appeared or defended to wait to file a notice of appearance strategically just
to add confusion to the process.
Chase also argues that it was improperly served. Resp't's Br. 20-21. However, Chase
cites exclusively to federal law regarding service of process, without citing any Idaho authority.
In addition to failing to properly preserve or raise this issue on cross-appeal, Chase has failed to
make any argument based on Idaho law that service was improper. This alone is reason enough
to reject Chase's contentions on this issue. Indeed, it is nearly the only basis on which this issue
can be decided. The record fails to include the Affidavit of Service referenced in the docket; the
only relevant record evidence appears in an affidavit filed by counsel for CMJ, affirming that "the
Defendants JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. were served by a process server on June 21, 2016, with
a Summons and Complaint in the above-entitled matter. See Affidavit of Service filed on or about
June 24, 2016." R. 33,

~

2. If Chase intended to challenge the entry of default on grounds of

improper service, it should have cross-appealed to raise that issue. At the very least, it should have
ensured that the Affidavit of Service was included in the clerk's record on appeal so that the Court
could specifically consider that issue. Its failure to do either of things precludes the Court's

3

Of course, CMJ was not obligated to serve such a notice because Chase had not yet appeared.
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consideration of this issue. Of course, the fact that Chase ultimately did appear in this action at
the district court means that regardless of how service was ultimately provided, Chase did get
notice of the action in time to appear.
Next, Chase asserts that the entry of default should be set aside because it is "incongruent"
with the district court's order denying CMJ' s application for default judgment. Resp 't 's Br. 21.
Chase does not support this assertion with argument. By the plain language of Rule 55(a)(l ), CMJ
was entitled to an entry of default: "When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief
is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise,
the court must order entry of the party's default." (emphasis added). There is no incongruency
where an entry of default does not subsequently lead to an entry of default judgment and there is
no basis here for setting aside the entry of default.
Chase also argues that on remand, the district court should hold a hearing where CMJ
would be required to prove its allegations with evidence. Resp 't 's Br. 21. This argument is based
on the authority granted to the district court in Rule 55(b)(2) to "conduct hearings or make referrals
when, to enter or effectuate judgment, it needs to ... (C) establish the truth of any allegation by
evidence; or (D) investigate any other matter." Here, there is simply no need for an evidentiary
hearing. The factual allegations in CMJ' s Complaint must be deemed admitted under Rule 8(b)( 6).
Further, Chase does not appear to reasonably dispute the factual allegations made in the Complaint.
Even if the Court were to rule that the issue of the maturity date is a legal rather than a factual
issue, the Court can and should resolve that question here, in this appeal. This matter should be
resolved firmly and finally at this stage.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - PAGE 18
A+J; Matter: 6652-008

4. CMJ is entitled to. attorney fees on appeal. Additionally, even if the Court rules
against CMJ, Chase is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal.
The parties' briefing for this appeal has occurred contemporaneously with the Idaho
Legislature's reconsideration of the applicable standard to determine when attorney fees are
appropriate under Idaho Code section 12-121. At the time of this writing, the Legislature has
passed and the Governor has approved an updated version of section 12-121, effective March 1,
2017, restoring the status quo prior to the Hoffer v. Shappard opinion. Accordingly, the applicable
standard is whether "the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or
without foundation." HB. No. 97.
Chase offers circular logic to address CMJ's claim for attorney fees: "Chase asserts that it
should prevail on this appeal, so it has not defended this appeal frivolously, unreasonably, or
without foundation." Resp't's Br. 23. If merely asserting that one should prevail were enough to
avoid liability for attorney fees under section 12-121, then the statute would never be invoked
because every litigant would make the same assertion.
The Court should grant CMJ its requested relief on appeal, which would make it the
prevailing party. The Court should further award CMJ attorney fees on appeal because Chase's
primary argument on the key legal issue is that "acceleration" and "maturity date" are concepts
that can be meaningfully distinguished and decoupled from each other. That is simply not so, and
it is frivolous and unreasonable to suggest otherwise. Accordingly, CMJ is entitled to its attorney
fees on appeal.
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If the Court instead upholds the district court's order, CMJ should not be liable for Chase's
attorney fees on appeal. Where an appellant brings a novel legal question to the Court, attorney
fees should not be granted against the party under section 12-121. Campbell v. Kildew, 141 Idaho
640, 651 (2005). Here, CMJ raised novel issues of law with respect to Idaho Code sections 6-411
and 6-413, where there is almost no jurisprudence. It also raised a novel legal issue in questioning
the continuing viability of Trusty v. Ray, 73 Idaho 232 (1952). Inviting the Court to clarify the
applicability of untested provisions ofldaho Code or of decades-old precedent is not frivolous and
should not serve as a basis for an adverse award of attorney fees. Chase's request for attorney fees
should be denied.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, CMJ respectfully requests that the Court reverse the district
court's order dismissing the case, remand with instructions to enter judgment in CMJ's favor, and
award CMJ costs and fees on appeal.

DATED this 24th day of March, 2017.

Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
CMJ Properties, LLC
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